INTRODUCTION
In a study of popular websites in 2009, we found widespread use of "Flash cookies."
1 Flash cookies, technically called "local shared objects," are files used by Adobe Flash developers to store data on users' computers. Our 2009 paper elucidated the advantages of Flash cookies from a developer perspective, and documented that some advertisers adopted Flash cookies because they were relatively unknown, more difficult for consumers to delete, and were more effective in tracking than HTTP cookies. We documented other tracking advantages of Flash cookies as well-they are more persistent than HTTP cookies, they can store 100KB of information by default (HTTP cookies only store 4KB), and they are stored such that all browsers on an computer can access them, meaning that even if a user switches browsers, Flash cookies enables the user to be tracked.
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RECENT RESEARCH
In recent years, there has been an explosion in research concerning user tracking online. In their ongoing investigations of web privacy issues, Bala Krishnamurthy, Konstantin Naryshkin, and Craig Wills studied how personal information flows from first to third party sites. They found that a majority of the popular sites they analyzed "directly leak sensitive and identifiable information to third-party aggregators. collection of information about users from an increasingly concentrated group of tracking companies. 4 Researchers have also focused upon new vectors for tracking. As early as 2003, Dean Gaudet described unique user tracking through using "ETags," a feature of the cache in browsers. 5 Samy Kamkar has demonstrated the "Evercookie," a tracking mechanism that uses Flash storage, HTML, and a variety of other techniques (including ETags) in order to make it resistant to user attempts to delete cookies and other unique identifiers. 6 Peter Eckersley has demonstrated the privacy risks associated with browser fingerprinting, where server-side scripts can query a browser for enough information to identify a computer. 7 In particular, recent research has focused upon the privacy implications of plugins such as Flash. As early as 2006, Corey Benninger noted that Flash cookies could be set without any visible sign to the user that Flash was running: "In fact, it would be difficult to reliably detect if an application were using flash cookies." 8 As Sipior, Ward, & Mendoza recently noted, addressing this risk by simply disabling Flash is unrealistic from a user perspective because an enormous amount of web content is delivered in formats requiring a plugin.
9 This is problematic from a privacy perspective, because once in place, the plugin infrastructure can be leveraged for unique user tracking and sharing of unique identifiers across domains.
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Important Flash security research related to our investigation concerns Flash's "cross domain" policies. According to Adobe, "A [cross-domain] policy file is a simple XML file that gives the Flash Player permission to access data from a given domain without displaying a security dialog. When placed on a server, it tells the Flash Player to allow direct access to data on that server, without prompting the user grant access."
11 This feature routes around the "same-origin policy" that underlies the security of the web, giving Flash applications the ability to read data on other domains and subdomains. 
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In follow-up research, different teams have found websites with "wildcard" entries in their cross-domain policies, meaning that they have marked as trusted any other domain on the web. Sebastian Lekies and colleagues found such wildcard policies in 2.8 percent of a sample of almost 1.1 million domains.
13 Dongseok Jang and colleagues found wildcard policies in 6 percent of their sample of 50,000 domains.
14 (This apparent disparity is a result of a greater concentration of cross-domain policies among popular sites, with adoption falling off in less popular sites.) Focusing upon crossdomain problems and other security issues from Flash implementations, Kuzma and colleagues found minor vulnerabilities on almost all educational websites they sampled, and more serious vulnerabilities on 20% of their sample. 15 The most important study related to our work was authored by Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor of Carnegie Mellon. 16 We direct the reader to our methods section, as it highlights key differences of our investigation. The McDonald team visited the landing page of the top 100 sites, plus a selection of random sites. Our current and 2009 studies are different in that we visit the top 100 sites and make 10 clicks on the same domain, to simulate a user session. As a result of this difference, McDonald et al. acknowledged that their scan represented a "lower bound" in counting of Flash cookies.
McDonald et al. also emphasizes the normative implications of Flash use for user tracking where sites are not using respawning. The use of Flash cookies for unique user tracking is problematic, because it is functionally equivalent to respawning. This is because users are generally not aware of Flash cookies and until very recently, browser controls did not address them. Whether or not a website respawns, if it uses Flash cookies, it can uniquely and persistently track individuals even in situations where the user has taken reasonable steps to avoid online profiling.
With our focus on respawning, we did not adequately articulate this problem in 2009. In fact, we referred to local shared objects as "Flash cookies" in order to make the issue more accessible to policymakers and others. But this caused many to speciously argue that Flash cookies are really no different than HTTP cookies. Local shared objects are not just like HTTP cookies-they are far more flexible than HTTP cookies, and the infrastructure that gave rise to them enabled an obscure and persistent tracking mechanism that largely is still in place today. Table 1 below sets forth the basic differences among the cookies analyzed in this paper.
HTML5 WEB STORAGE
Flash cookies may be just a bridge technology for online trackers. HTML5 storage offers many advantages over ordinary cookies, and since it does not involve using a plugin (like Flash), HTML5 may become a more universal tracking mechanism. Like Flash cookies, HTML5 storage is more persistent than HTTP cookies. HTTP cookies expire by default, and in order to make them persistent, developers must use a complex syntax and constantly update the expiration date. HTML5 data are persistent until affirmatively deleted by a web site or user. Storage size is important too. While Flash cookies have a default limit of 100KB, HTTP cookies store just 4KB, compared to 5Mb for HTML5 storage. However, to our knowledge, no one has performed a survey of HTML5 privacy practices. Thus, as part of our update to our original Flash cookies investigation, we also captured and analyzed HTML5 data. 24 The Network Advertising Initiative (NAI), a US-based self-regulatory project hosted by a public relations firm, said that its members should not use Flash cookies for online behavioral advertising purposes until, "…such time as web browser tools allow for the same level of transparency and control as is available today for standard HTTP cookies." 25 We note that the developments of this year arguably greenlight the use of Flash cookies under the NAI rule, and in any case, the NAI ban only pertains to OBArelated uses of Flash cookies.
TECHNICAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS SURROUNDING FLASH COOKIES
METHODS
We largely followed the methods of our 2009 paper with some improvements to ensure a clean state between sessions. We crawled the top 100 U.S. websites based upon QuantCast.com's ranking of July 13, 2011. The data collection occurred on July 21, 2011. We used two PCs with virtualized Linux/Ubuntu OSes, being careful to restore the virtual machine after each website visited, in order to avoid contamination. Using Firefox version 5, we called the site URL and then made 10 arbitrary clicks on each website, being careful to remain on the same top-level-domain. We collected HTTP, HTML5, and Flash cookies from these crawling sessions. We never "signed in" to a website in this process.
Because of the dynamic nature of websites and online advertising, any given survey may produce different advertisements and correspondingly different HTTP, HTML5, and Flash cookies. Thus, our snapshot may differ 24 from another user's experience. However we feel that this provides reasonable sample for study.
We used several methods to detect and confirm respawning cookies, including manually deleting HTML cookies to see whether they reappeared. We also injected arbitrary values into objects to see whether those same values would later appear in HTTP and HTML5 cookies.
RESULTS & DISCUSSION
HTTP COOKIES
We detected cookies on all top 100 websites. In total, we detected 5,675 HTTP cookies. This is dramatically higher than the 3,602 we detected in 2009. Twenty sites placed 100 or more cookies, including seven that placed more than 150 (wikia.com, 242; legacy.com, 230; foxnews.com, 185; bizrate.com, 175; drudgereport.com, 168; myspace.com, 151; time.com 151).
The most frequently appearing cookie keys were: uid, id, PREF, __utmz, __utma, __utmb, and UID. Many of these keys are commonly associated with unique user tracking. For instance, __utma is used by Google for identifying unique visitors.
Most cookies-4915 of them-were placed by a third party host.
We detected over 600 third party hosts among the 4915 third party cookies. Google had cookies on 89 of the top 100 sites; the company's ad tracking network, doubleclick.net, had cookies on 77. Combined, Google has a presence on 97 of the top 100 websites. This includes popular government websites such as usps.com, irs.gov, and nih.gov. Only microsoft.com, ups.com, and wikipedia.org lacked some type of Google cookie.
Other third party trackers with a strong presence in the top 100 included scorecardresearch.com (61), and atdmt.com (56). Among top 100 sites, wikia.com, legacy.com, foxnews.com, drudgereport.com, and bizrate.com hosted the most cookies from third party domains.
FLASH COOKIES -LOCAL SHARED OBJECTS
We found 100 Flash cookies on the top 100 sites, down from the 281 we found in 2009. These Flash cookies appeared on 37 sites, down from the 54 sites we found in 2009.
Flash cookies can store many keys and values. MTV.com had 8 flash cookies, one of which stored over 140 values. We found 454 key/value pairs in 100 Flash cookies detected. The most common keys used were: expiration, volume, creation, domainHash, campaignTracking, id, and time.
Two sites had shared values between Flash cookies and HTTP cookies: hulu.com and foxnews.com. In the case of foxnews.com, the value was shared in HTML5 local storage as well.
HTML5 STORAGE
Seventeen of the top 100 sites were using HTML5 local storage. These 17 sites had a total of 60 key/value pairs.
We found matching values among HTML5 local storage and HTTP cookies in several cases. Twitter.com, tmz.com, squidoo.com, nytimes.com, hulu.com, foxnews.com, and cnn.com had such matching values. In most of these cases, the matching value was with a third party service, such as meebo.com, kissanalytics.com, and polldaddy.com.
RESPAWNING
We found three respawning behaviors on two sites: hulu.com and foxnews.com.
In 2009, we reported that a QuantCast cookie was respawned on hulu.com. After our 2009 paper, QuantCast executives contacted authors Hoofnagle and Soltani almost immediately, and quickly acted to change the behavior of their service in order to prevent respawning. 26 Nevertheless, hulu.com, QuantCast, and other companies were sued for the practice, and the case settled this year. In a summary of Flash cookies filed with the court, it was claimed that websites such as Hulu did not know that third party services provided by QuantCast and Clearspring tracked users through Flash. 27 This assertion effectively shifted the blame from consumer-facing websites to the third party tracking companies involved. In the settlement flowing from the suit, QuantCast and Clearspring explicitly promised to not respawn cookies using Flash, or to use Flash as an alternative to HTTP cookies for tracking purposes. 28 These obligations did not apply to consumer-facing websites, such as hulu.com.
We found two different methods of cookie respawning on hulu.com.
First, hulu.com used standard Flash respawning to reinstantiate a HTTP cookie with the key "guid," mirroring a stored object with the key "computerguid." There are two important points to raise about this: unlike the situation in 2009, where a third party respawned the cookies, this use of Flash is in-house at hulu.com. And, while Adobe points out that local storage enables the delivery of rich content, hulu.com's use of Flash appears to fall into the category of unique user tracking condemned by Adobe. Adobe argues that such uses of Flash should be subject to express user consent. 29 Second, we found first party HTTP and HTML5 cookies respawned on hulu.com through a service hosted at kissmetrics.com. This respawning employed the cache to mirror values, specifically ETags. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of this ETag tracking "in the wild."
ETag tracking and respawning is particularly problematic because the technique generates unique tracking values even where the consumer blocks HTTP, Flash, and HTML5 cookies. In order to block this tracking, the user would have to clear the cache between each website visit. Even in private browsing mode, ETags can track the user during a browser session. Additionally, the ETag respawning we observed set a first party cookie on hulu.com. This means that other sites subscribing to the kissmetrics.com service could synchronize these identifiers across their domains.
The script for this function, hosted at http://doug1izaerwt3.cloudfront.net, includes other code that indicates its author is aware of tracking and the risk of data collection about the user. For instance, it includes a function to detect the collection of information that credit card companies require websites to control more carefully.
On June 30, 2011, Hulu.com updated its privacy policy to include disclosures surrounding Flash cookies. 30 This update appears to be driven by obligations in the Flash cookies settlement, which requires consumerfacing websites to include, "in its online Privacy Policy, a disclosure of its use of LSOs and a link to at least one website or utility offering users the ability to manage LSOs, if such website or utility is available." 31 In this updated policy, Hulu.com includes a link to Adobe's Flash cookie manager, discloses that it uses Flash cookies, but then downplays their potential for tracking: "Local Shared Objects are similar to browser cookies, but can store data more complex than simple text. By themselves, they cannot do anything to or with the data on your computer."
We object to this last sentence in particular. While it is technically true that by themselves Flash cookies cannot do anything to the data on a user's computer, in reality, Flash cookies never are used by themselves. It is the code accompanying Flash cookies that enables them to mirror other data, and can be used to reinstantate that data when deleted by the user.
The hulu.com privacy policy does not mention respawning of any kind, and even claims that "You can configure your Internet browser to warn you each time a cookie is being sent or to refuse cookies completely. However, unless you accept cookies, you will not have access to certain Hulu Services."
Hulu.com's updated policy also describes "Web beacons." It is unclear whether this section of the policy describes kissmetrics.com cache respawning. The description would not lead an average user to understand that the cache was being used to undo cookie deletion.
We find it surprising that months after settling a suit involving unique user tracking through third parties, hulu.com has moved Flash tracking and respawning in-house. Furthermore, the use of kissmetrics cache cookie respawning is very similar to the respawning we found in 2009-hulu.com used a third party to engage in tracking that users do not know about, cannot detect, and effectively cannot block.
Kissmetrics.com has a privacy policy as well, but it is targeted to commercial buyers of the kissmetrics.com service, rather than average web users.
We also found respawning on foxnews.com associated with voting in web polls. A third party polldaddy.com Flash cookie (hosted at i0.poll.fm) respawned an HTML5 cookie on foxnews.com. This cookie's key corresponded to the number assigned to the poll that our researcher engaged in. It appears to prevent the user from voting in the same poll twice.
Foxnews.com's privacy policy does disclose it "may use" Flash and other cookies. 32 It does not mention respawning.
CONCLUSION
In 2009, we surveyed the most popular websites to determine how they were using Flash cookies. In this followup study, we found that fewer websites are using Flash cookies. Fewer are also respawning cookies using Flash. However, one popular site is using both Flash and the user's cache to respawn HTTP and HTML5 cookies in a way that cannot be blocked currently by the browser.
We also found many HTTP cookies on top sites, most of which originate from third parties. Google in particular has the ability to track user behavior across nearly all top sites-97 of them.
Although there is much potential for privacy-enhancing applications of HTML5 local storage, it nevertheless may emerge as a new tracking vector. Seventeen of the sites we surveyed employed HTML5 local storage, several did so in order to mirror a tracking identifier from a third party. 
